claim: Information regulation often overlooks how audiences adjust their beliefs and actions based on the strictness of laws governing statement veracity. His research aims to address this "audience gap" by using a Bayesian game to model interactions between speakers, targets, and audiences, particularly examining how legal strictness impacts their behavior and the resulting information landscape.

evidence_quote: public(Heymann, 2012). Whateverthereason,regulationoftheinformationenvironment—theflowand qualityofinformationtothepublic—affectsaudiencesandtheirbeliefsquite directly. Ourobjecthereistobridgetheaudiencegapbyformalizingtheinteraction betweenspeakers,thetargetsoftheirspeech,andmembersoftheaudience.We employatoolthatisnaturallyaptatanalyzingthisissue,namely,aBayesian game,andweinvestigatetheimpactofthestrictnessofthelawontheemergingPerfectBayesianEquilibria(PBE).Underthisframework,aspeaker,who has private information about a business or individual (“target”), may make Draft,Vol.0,No.0, doi:/ewmxxx (cid:13)c . Allrightsreserved.ForPermissions,pleaseemail: 2 .V0N0 claims about the target to an...

citation: Yonathan A. Arbel & Murat C. Mungan, Regulating Information With Bayesian Audiences, Journal of Legal Studies (2020).

confidence: machine-linked

limitations: Machine-linked claim. Use the evidence quote and PDF before treating it as a quotation or as a complete statement of the paper's position.


claim: The common approach to regulating information exchange has a significant blind spot: it often fails to account for the dynamic ways in which audiences adapt. Specifically, how audiences adjust their beliefs and subsequent actions is directly influenced by the perceived strictness of the laws that govern the truthfulness of statements. This oversight can lead to miscalibrated regulations.

paper_title: Regulating Information With Bayesian Audiences

evidence_quote: ulstatements.Whencourtsarelesscapableof accuratelyadjudicatingstatements,thesocialcostofusingthecourtsystem— operationalizedbylitigationcosts—iskeyindeterminingwhetherinformation shouldberegulated.Eveninthesecases,whenthegainsfromfacilitatingbeneficialinteractionsanddeterringharmfulonesdwarfslitigationcosts,moderate damagesemergeastheoptimalchoice.2 Anotherimplicationpertainstothepotentialdynamicimpactofinformation regulating laws. Specifically, moderate laws that cause the audience to rationally rely on speakers’ statements broadens the gap between the frequency withwhichtheaudienceinteractswithgoodtypesversusbadtypes.Thisnaturally increases the returns from being a good versus a bad...