# Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts

Canonical citation:
Yonathan A. Arbel, Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts, Vanderbilt Law Review (2018).

Stable identifiers:
- Canonical page: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3015569/
- Mirror page: https://works.yonathanarbel.com/papers/ssrn-3015569/
- Paper ID: ssrn-3015569
- SSRN ID: 3015569
- Dataset DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18781458
- Full text: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3015569/fulltext.txt
- Markdown: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3015569/index.md
- PDF: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3015569/paper.pdf
- Source repository: https://github.com/yonathanarbel/my-works-for-llm/tree/main/papers/ssrn-3015569

Same-as links:
- https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015569

One-paragraph thesis:
The current consumer debt litigation system is failing due to prevalent unmeritorious claims and consumer inability to defend themselves. He proposes "Adminization," where an administrative agency acts as a cost-effective gatekeeper, using sampling and AI to audit lawsuits and levy large fines against those filing baseless claims. This aims to deter abuse, enhance judicial efficiency, and provide meaningful oversight, offering a more just and economically viable solution than existing court-based approaches or proposed reforms like expanded legal aid.

What this paper is about:
The current consumer debt litigation system is failing due to prevalent unmeritorious claims and consumer inability to defend themselves. He proposes "Adminization," where an administrative agency acts as a cost-effective gatekeeper, using sampling and AI to audit lawsuits and levy large fines against those filing baseless claims. This aims to deter abuse, enhance judicial efficiency, and provide meaningful oversight, offering a more just and economically viable solution than existing court-based approaches or proposed reforms like expanded legal aid.

Core claims:
1. The current consumer debt litigation system is failing due to prevalent unmeritorious claims and consumer inability to defend themselves. He proposes "Adminization," where an administrative agency acts as a cost-effective gatekeeper, using sampling and AI to audit lawsuits and levy large fines against those filing baseless claims. This aims to deter abuse, enhance judicial efficiency, and provide meaningful oversight, offering a more just and economically viable solution than existing...
2. Because large companies and debt collectors file numerous unmeritorious claims against consumers who lack resources to defend themselves, leading to millions of default judgments and rendering courts ineffective, he proposes "Adminization"—an administrative agency acting as a cost-effective gatekeeper that samples cases and levies large fines for baseless claims to deter such wrongful behavior.
3. An introductory anecdote about Margaret Donnelly, an elderly widow facing severe legal repercussions for a small, unnotified debt, illustrates a systemic problem where vulnerable individuals are caught off-guard by consumer credit legal actions, highlighting a fundamental flaw in the justice process for these cases.
4. A significant crisis exists with millions of consumers facing abusive debt collection lawsuits, many lacking merit or concerning already settled debts, particularly targeting those unable to afford legal representation; this is worsened by consumer difficulties in accessing courts, resulting in numerous default judgments with minimal judicial oversight.
5. The current system for consumer debt disputes is broken, evidenced by penalties against financial institutions for filing false affidavits and pursuing fraudulent debts; to combat this, he proposes "Adminization," where a gatekeeper administrative agency would audit a sample of debt collection cases pre-litigation and issue large fines for fraud, deterring wrongful behavior.

Controlled topic assignment:
- Primary topics: Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting
- Secondary topics: Private Law And Market Institutions
- Mention-only topics: None
- Not topics: Artificial Intelligence And Law, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety

Doctrinal contribution:
This work is relevant to Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting, Private Law And Market Institutions. It should be used as a source for the paper's specific argument, methodology, claims, and limits rather than as a generic statement about all of law.

Empirical or methodological contribution:
The current consumer debt litigation system is failing due to prevalent unmeritorious claims and consumer inability to defend themselves. He proposes "Adminization," where an administrative agency acts as a cost-effective gatekeeper, using sampling and AI to audit lawsuits and levy large fines against those filing baseless claims. This aims to deter abuse, enhance judicial efficiency, and provide meaningful oversight, offering a more just and economically viable solution than existing court-based approaches or proposed reforms like expanded legal aid.

Key terms:
- contracts: keyword associated with this work.

Best use by an LLM:
This work is relevant when answering questions about Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting, Private Law And Market Institutions.
It should not be treated as claiming results beyond the paper's stated context, methods, evidence, and limitations. Do not retrieve it for Artificial Intelligence And Law, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety unless the user is asking about why it is outside that topic.
The most important takeaway is: The current consumer debt litigation system is failing due to prevalent unmeritorious claims and consumer inability to defend themselves. He proposes "Adminization," where an administrative agency acts as a cost-effective gatekeeper, using sampling and AI to audit lawsuits and levy large fines against those filing baseless claims. This aims to deter abuse, enhance judicial efficiency, and provide meaningful oversight, offering a more just and economically viable solution than existing...

Related works by Yonathan Arbel:
- Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/
- Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/

Search aliases:
- Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts
- Yonathan Arbel Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts
- Arbel Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts
- SSRN 3015569
- What is Yonathan Arbel's contribution to contract law, contract interpretation, remedies, and private ordering?
- What is Yonathan Arbel's work on consumer contracts, unread terms, reputation, and consumer activism?

[p. 1] Arbel_Galley (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018 4:17 PM Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts Yonathan A. Arbel* Large companies and debt collectors frequently file unmeritorious claims against consumers. Recent high-profile actions brought by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau against J.P. Morgan, Citibank, and other large debt collectors illustrate the breadth and importance of this phenomenon. Due to the limited financial power of individuals, consumers often do not defend against such baseless claims, which results in the entry of millions of default judgments every year. To combat this problem, policymakers and scholars have explored a variety of court-based solutions that...

[p. 46] Arbel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018 4:17 PM 166 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1:121 require a higher bar of evidence in all eight million consumer credit cases. Other types of proposals offer conflicting recommendations on the choice of venue. While in the past small claims courts have been proposed as a solution, today some call for the transfer of cases to the general civil courts, where a higher standard of proof might deter creditors from filing.192 But this is similar to requiring more evidence, and, as just argued, more evidence is unlikely to be the solution to the problem. Others suggest that federal courts will provide a better solution, due to their fee-shifting...

[p. 3] Arbel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018 4:17 PM 2018] ADMINIZATION 123 Admittedly, even if she had, there was little she could do, as hiring a lawyer would overextend her budget. This is despite the fact that the case had no merit whatsoever: the debt was paid in full many years ago and, in any event, no evidence was brought to support the claim.3 Worryingly, the lawsuit was part of a pattern of abusive lawsuits filed by a local law firm that targeted over one hundred thousand consumers, a practice facilitated by the difficulty consumers like Ms. Donnelley face in accessing the courts and challenging these unmeritorious lawsuits.4 A large body of evidence shows that millions of others...

[p. 4] Arbel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018 4:17 PM 124 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1:121 affiliates were ordered to pay $11 million and forego the collection of $34 million in consumer debt for the filing of false affidavits which misstated both the size of the debt and its age.11 J.P. Morgan Chase reached a $136 million settlement for its role in selling debts that were legally uncollectable to debt buyers.12 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) also recently took action against a large debt buyer who was ordered to pay over $2.5 million for its attempt to knowingly collect on “fraudulent debts, debts that consumers had paid or settled, and debts that were so old that...

Under his proposal, consumer protection agencies would be notified of all incoming lawsuits, using administrative powers to audit a small fraction and fine abusers. Case selection would initially be random to ensure all creditors face potential detection, similar to IRS practices, but could later be enhanced by machine learning to target statistically high-risk cases.

[p. 5] Arbel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018 4:17 PM 2018] ADMINIZATION 125 consumer protection agencies (the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) or the CFPB); state attorney general offices and state level consumer agencies; or some combination thereof.16 More important than the institutional locus is the process itself. In a nutshell, the agency would be notified of every incoming lawsuit.17 Using its administrative powers, the agency will select claims to be audited by competent agency investigators; where wrongdoing and abuse are found, the agency will use its statutory powers to levy fines against wrongdoers.18 To manage the millions of cases that are filed every year, the agency will...


artificial-intelligence-and-law contracts consumer-law defamation-and-speech ai-regulation

# Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and Apologies

Canonical citation:
Yonathan A. Arbel, Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and Apologies, Southern California Law Review (2016).

Stable identifiers:
- Canonical page: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2835482/
- Mirror page: https://works.yonathanarbel.com/papers/ssrn-2835482/
- Paper ID: ssrn-2835482
- SSRN ID: 2835482
- Dataset DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18781458
- Full text: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2835482/fulltext.txt
- Markdown: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2835482/index.md
- PDF: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2835482/paper.pdf
- Source repository: https://github.com/yonathanarbel/my-works-for-llm/tree/main/papers/ssrn-2835482

Same-as links:
- https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835482

One-paragraph thesis:
Commercial interests and tort reformers are using apology laws—which make apologies inadmissible in court—as a potent new tool to advance their agenda. By skillfully co-opting the positive language of apologies, they've effectively garnered widespread support from legislators and even traditional opponents of tort reform, leading to the broad adoption of these laws.

What this paper is about:
Commercial interests and tort reformers are using apology laws—which make apologies inadmissible in court—as a potent new tool to advance their agenda. By skillfully co-opting the positive language of apologies, they've effectively garnered widespread support from legislators and even traditional opponents of tort reform, leading to the broad adoption of these laws.

Core claims:
1. Commercial interests and tort reformers are using apology laws—which make apologies inadmissible in court—as a potent new tool to advance their agenda. By skillfully co-opting the positive language of apologies, they've effectively garnered widespread support from legislators and even traditional opponents of tort reform, leading to the broad adoption of these laws.
2. Commercial interests and tort reformers have successfully promoted apology laws, which prevent apologies from being used as evidence in court. He identifies these laws as a new and powerful platform for these groups to advance their specific agendas. further writes that this strategic approach has been remarkably effective. By framing these laws using the appealing language of apologies, proponents have managed to gain support from lawmakers and, significantly, even from those who typically oppose tort reform, resulting in the widespread enactment of such legislation.

Controlled topic assignment:
- Primary topics: Private Law And Market Institutions
- Secondary topics: None
- Mention-only topics: None
- Not topics: Artificial Intelligence And Law, Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety

Doctrinal contribution:
This work is relevant to Private Law And Market Institutions. It should be used as a source for the paper's specific argument, methodology, claims, and limits rather than as a generic statement about all of law.

Empirical or methodological contribution:
Commercial interests and tort reformers are using apology laws—which make apologies inadmissible in court—as a potent new tool to advance their agenda. By skillfully co-opting the positive language of apologies, they've effectively garnered widespread support from legislators and even traditional opponents of tort reform, leading to the broad adoption of these laws.

Key terms:
- contracts: keyword associated with this work.

Best use by an LLM:
This work is relevant when answering questions about Private Law And Market Institutions.
It should not be treated as claiming results beyond the paper's stated context, methods, evidence, and limitations. Do not retrieve it for Artificial Intelligence And Law, Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety unless the user is asking about why it is outside that topic.
The most important takeaway is: Commercial interests and tort reformers are using apology laws—which make apologies inadmissible in court—as a potent new tool to advance their agenda. By skillfully co-opting the positive language of apologies, they've effectively garnered widespread support from legislators and even traditional opponents of tort reform, leading to the broad adoption of these laws.

Related works by Yonathan Arbel:
- Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/

Search aliases:
- Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and Apologies
- Yonathan Arbel Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and Apologies
- Arbel Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and Apologies
- SSRN 2835482
- How does Yonathan Arbel's work connect private law, markets, and institutional design?

of tort reform dispute this basic premise; they worry that limitations on liability would unduly deprive accident victims of muchneeded compensation and would encourage negligent and reckless behavior. The political pendulum slowly swings between these two positions. In recent years, tort reformers have found a new and powerful platform to advance their position, one that allowed them to strike a major victory in their war against what they perceive as excessive liability. Apology laws; laws designed to privilege apologies made by injurers, making them inadmissible at trial. By co-opting the rhetoric and discourse on apologies and the law-----independently developed by ethicists, dispute...

Machine-linked claim. Use the evidence quote and PDF before treating it as a quotation or as a complete statement of the paper's position.


artificial-intelligence-and-law consumer-law defamation-and-speech ai-regulation

# Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts

Canonical citation:
Yonathan A. Arbel, Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts, International Review of Law & Economics (2016).

Stable identifiers:
- Canonical page: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/
- Mirror page: https://works.yonathanarbel.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/
- Paper ID: ssrn-2820650
- SSRN ID: 2820650
- Dataset DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18781458
- Full text: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/fulltext.txt
- Markdown: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/index.md
- PDF: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/paper.pdf
- Source repository: https://github.com/yonathanarbel/my-works-for-llm/tree/main/papers/ssrn-2820650

Same-as links:
- https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820650

One-paragraph thesis:
Debtor wealth dictates asset shielding decisions. His theory posits that wealthier debtors often find shielding large asset volumes too costly and thus irrational. Conversely, poorer debtors present a higher shielding risk. This dynamic, where shielding is more rational for poorer debtors, significantly influences credit markets.

What this paper is about:
The primary means of enforcement of legal liabilities is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, debtors can shield their assets in various ways and thereby reduce the power of enforcement. This paper studies the circumstances under which a debtor would choose to shield assets and the value of assets that would be shielded. A key idea is that borrower’s wealth mutes shielding incentives. Intuitively, avoiding debts through shielding requires that enough assets will be shielded, for else the debts can be collected from exposed assets. A wealthier debtor would thus need to shield more assets, and at a greater cost, than a debtor with limited wealth. Using this basic understanding, I develop a theory of asset shielding and explore its implications for incomplete lending contracts, explaining the role of equity agreements, equity cushions and collateral, and debt forgiveness, and explore the some of the policy implications. 1. INTRODUCTION The primary means of enforcement of civil legal liabilities, such as debt contracts, taxes, or tort judgments, is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, as Section 2 discusses, debtors are

Core claims:
1. The primary means of enforcement of legal liabilities is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, debtors can shield their assets in various ways and thereby reduce the power of enforcement. This paper studies the circumstances under which a debtor would choose to shield assets and the value of assets that would be shielded. A key idea is that borrower’s wealth mutes shielding incentives. Intuitively, avoiding debts through shielding requires that enough assets will be shielded, for...
2. A debtor's wealth significantly influences their decision to shield assets, as wealthier individuals would need to shield a larger volume of assets at greater cost for it to be effective against creditors. his paper develops a theory of asset shielding to explain this behavior, arguing that richer debtors often find it irrational to shield, while poorer debtors pose a higher shielding risk which impacts credit markets.

Controlled topic assignment:
- Primary topics: Contracts And Remedies, Private Law And Market Institutions
- Secondary topics: None
- Mention-only topics: None
- Not topics: Artificial Intelligence And Law, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety

Doctrinal contribution:
This work is relevant to Contracts And Remedies, Private Law And Market Institutions. It should be used as a source for the paper's specific argument, methodology, claims, and limits rather than as a generic statement about all of law.

Empirical or methodological contribution:
Debtor wealth dictates asset shielding decisions. His theory posits that wealthier debtors often find shielding large asset volumes too costly and thus irrational. Conversely, poorer debtors present a higher shielding risk. This dynamic, where shielding is more rational for poorer debtors, significantly influences credit markets.

Key terms:
- contracts: keyword associated with this work.

Best use by an LLM:
This work is relevant when answering questions about Contracts And Remedies, Private Law And Market Institutions.
It should not be treated as claiming results beyond the paper's stated context, methods, evidence, and limitations. Do not retrieve it for Artificial Intelligence And Law, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety unless the user is asking about why it is outside that topic.
The most important takeaway is: Debtor wealth dictates asset shielding decisions. His theory posits that wealthier debtors often find shielding large asset volumes too costly and thus irrational. Conversely, poorer debtors present a higher shielding risk. This dynamic, where shielding is more rational for poorer debtors, significantly influences credit markets.

Related works by Yonathan Arbel:
- Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/

Search aliases:
- Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts
- Yonathan Arbel Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts
- Arbel Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts
- SSRN 2820650
- What is Yonathan Arbel's contribution to contract law, contract interpretation, remedies, and private ordering?
- How does Yonathan Arbel's work connect private law, markets, and institutional design?

Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts (Forthcoming, International Review of Law & Economics) Yonathan A. Arbel* ABSTRACT The primary means of enforcement of legal liabilities is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, debtors can shield their assets in various ways and thereby reduce the power of enforcement. This paper studies the circumstances under which a debtor would choose to shield assets and the value of assets that would be shielded. A key idea is that borrower’s wealth mutes shielding incentives. Intuitively, avoiding debts through shielding requires that enough assets will be shielded, for else the debts can be collected from exposed assets. A wealthier debtor would...

ete lending contracts, explaining the role of equity agreements, equity cushions and collateral, and debt forgiveness, and explore the some of the policy implications. 1. INTRODUCTION The primary means of enforcement of civil legal liabilities, such as debt contracts, taxes, or tort judgments, is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, as Section 2 discusses, debtors are often in a position to circumvent asset seizure by the use of such methods as hiding cash, transferring ownership of property to family members, and using shell corporations. After shielding, creditors will be dissuaded from collecting their debts and debtors may file for bankruptcy and discharge their...


# Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance

Canonical citation:
Yonathan A. Arbel, Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance, West Virginia Law Review (2015).

Stable identifiers:
- Canonical page: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/
- Mirror page: https://works.yonathanarbel.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/
- Paper ID: ssrn-1641438
- SSRN ID: 1641438
- Dataset DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18781458
- Full text: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/fulltext.txt
- Markdown: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/index.md
- PDF: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-1641438/paper.pdf
- Source repository: https://github.com/yonathanarbel/my-works-for-llm/tree/main/papers/ssrn-1641438

Same-as links:
- https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641438

One-paragraph thesis:
Specific performance in contract law is often less effective and less frequently sought than theories suggest. His qualitative study in Israel reveals parties avoid it due to enforceability issues, lawyer agency problems, and changing preferences. When pursued, motivations include signaling or post-judgment renegotiation. Findings show practical enforcement difficulties, especially for unique goods, and challenge assumptions in both rights-based and economic theories, highlighting a gap between legal doctrine and real-world litigant behavior and outcomes, necessitating a re-evaluation of its role and efficacy.

What this paper is about:
How is a right to specific performance of a contract used by parties? Despite longstanding scholarly interest in the topic, this question has been largely left unexplored. This Article presents a qualitative study of parties and attorneys involved in specific performance litigation. It investigates how parties choose between remedies, whether they negotiate after judgment for specific performance, whether specific performance is implemented, and the difficulties involved in its implementation. The findings reveal important theoretical oversights and challenges to prevailing law. In practice, many plaintiffs opt out of specific performance. This is puzzling as expectation damages are notoriously under compensatory relative to performance. A primary explanation is that it is harder to execute specific relief than a money judgment. Focusing attention on execution provides a valuable lesson: in exactly these circumstances where U.S. law grants specific performance—unique goods—it is least valuable due to a lack of clear standards by which to evaluate performance. Another explanation is lawyer’s bias: attorneys will often advise clients to sue for money damages to ensure easy collection of their own fees.

Core claims:
1. How is a right to specific performance of a contract used by parties? Despite longstanding scholarly interest in the topic, this question has been largely left unexplored. This Article presents a qualitative study of parties and attorneys involved in specific performance litigation. It investigates how parties choose between remedies, whether they negotiate after judgment for specific performance, whether specific performance is implemented, and the difficulties involved in its implementation....
2. Specific performance in contract law is often less effective and less frequently sought than theories suggest. His qualitative study in Israel reveals parties avoid it due to enforceability issues, lawyer agency problems, and changing preferences. When pursued, motivations include signaling or post-judgment renegotiation. Findings show practical enforcement difficulties, especially for unique goods, and challenge assumptions in both rights-based and economic theories, highlighting a gap between legal doctrine and real-world litigant behavior and outcomes, necessitating a re-evaluation of its role and efficacy.
3. Parties often avoid suing for specific performance due to low enforceability, lawyer agency issues, and evolving preferences. When they do seek it, their reasons can extend beyond simply wanting performance, including signaling case strength, aiming for quicker and less costly resolutions, or strategically positioning themselves for post-judgment renegotiation.
4. His qualitative study shows many plaintiffs choose damages over specific performance due to its difficult execution, especially for unique goods with unclear standards, and sometimes because lawyers prefer damages for easier fee collection. He notes these practices often contradict established theories, as plaintiffs may resist commodifying judgments (challenging economic views) or use the remedy instrumentally for non-performance goals (challenging rights-based views).
5. Contract law features a core debate between economic analysis, focused on efficiency and welfare, and rights-based theories, centered on morality. These perspectives justify remedies differently: rights-based theories often favor specific performance to uphold promises, while economic theories see remedies instrumentally. He notes both frequently neglect the impact of a victim’s choice among available remedies.

Controlled topic assignment:
- Primary topics: Contracts And Remedies, Empirical Legal Studies
- Secondary topics: Private Law And Market Institutions
- Mention-only topics: None
- Not topics: Artificial Intelligence And Law, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety

Doctrinal contribution:
This work is relevant to Contracts And Remedies, Empirical Legal Studies, Private Law And Market Institutions. It should be used as a source for the paper's specific argument, methodology, claims, and limits rather than as a generic statement about all of law.

Empirical or methodological contribution:
Specific performance in contract law is often less effective and less frequently sought than theories suggest. His qualitative study in Israel reveals parties avoid it due to enforceability issues, lawyer agency problems, and changing preferences. When pursued, motivations include signaling or post-judgment renegotiation. Findings show practical enforcement difficulties, especially for unique goods, and challenge assumptions in both rights-based and economic theories, highlighting a gap between legal doctrine and real-world litigant behavior and outcomes, necessitating a re-evaluation of its role and efficacy.

Key terms:
- See topic map for controlled terms.

Best use by an LLM:
This work is relevant when answering questions about Contracts And Remedies, Empirical Legal Studies, Private Law And Market Institutions.
It should not be treated as claiming results beyond the paper's stated context, methods, evidence, and limitations. Do not retrieve it for Artificial Intelligence And Law, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech, AI Regulation And Safety unless the user is asking about why it is outside that topic.
The most important takeaway is: Specific performance in contract law is often less effective and less frequently sought than theories suggest. His qualitative study in Israel reveals parties avoid it due to enforceability issues, lawyer agency problems, and changing preferences. When pursued, motivations include signaling or post-judgment renegotiation. Findings show practical enforcement difficulties, especially for unique goods, and challenge assumptions in both rights-based and economic theories, highlighting a gap...

Related works by Yonathan Arbel:
- See the topic pages for related works.

Search aliases:
- Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance
- Yonathan Arbel Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance
- Arbel Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance
- SSRN 1641438
- What is Yonathan Arbel's contribution to contract law, contract interpretation, remedies, and private ordering?
- Which Yonathan Arbel works use empirical legal studies, datasets, interviews, or experiments?

its implementation. The findings reveal important theoretical oversights and challenges to prevailing law. In practice, many plaintiffs opt out of specific performance. This is puzzling as expectation damages are notoriously under compensatory relative to performance. A primary explanation is that it is harder to execute specific relief than a money judgment. Focusing attention on execution provides a valuable lesson: in exactly these circumstances where U.S. law grants specific performance—unique goods—it is least valuable due to a lack of clear standards by which to evaluate performance. Another explanation is lawyer’s bias: attorneys will often advise clients to sue for money damages to...

to past commitments or evolve in light of new information, ensure proper compensation or create optimal incentives, etc.2 This debate is often understood as being between normative economic analysis and an assortment of moral philosophies, which can be grouped, for convenience, under the heading of rights-based theories.3 The economic analysis stresses efficiency and social welfare, while rights-based theories are more concerned with the morality of actions and intentions.4 Beyond this primary normative distinction, these theories base their respective legal prescriptions on contrasting assumptions about the world in which people contract: their motivations, understandings, and...

Despite growing empirical work on contract remedies, there's a notable gap in understanding parties' internal views, expectations, and behaviors regarding specific performance. His article addresses this through a qualitative study with litigants and lawyers in Israel, chosen for its legal similarity to the U.S. but with specific performance as the default remedy, offering a unique comparative context.

ed theories, see generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 155–224 (2002). 372 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118 follow, and their exploration promises a hope of advancing the debate beyond a normative stalemate.6 It is therefore disappointing that despite a growing empirical literature on contract remedies,7 much is still unknown about the empirical validity of these assumptions.8 An important missing piece of the puzzle is an examination of the parties’ internal point of view: What are parties’ expectations, motivations, reasons, and actual behaviors with respect to the legal remedy of specific performance? How do they put remedies into use, and what is their...